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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
TROY STEPHEN HECHTLE, ] 
Defendant-Appellant. 
> BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
} Case No. 20020543-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) which gives this Court authority over appeals of criminal cases 
involving class B misdemeanors. The Fifth Judicial District Court entered its final order on 
June 13,2002, therein convicting the above-named Appellant of three counts: Driving with 
Any Measurable Controlled Substance in the Body, a violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §41-
6-44.6 (2000), a Class B Misdemeanor; Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, to 
wit: Marijuana, a violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (1999), a Class B 
Misdemeanor; Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-
37a-5 (1981), a Class B Misdemeanor. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Whether or not the district court judge properly concluded that Trooper Bairett had 
probable cause to arrest the Appellant pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.6 and the 
search of the appellant was incident to that arrest. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"The factual findings of a trial court that underlie its decision to grant or deny a 
motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous." State v. Wells. 
928 P.2d 386, 388 (Utah App. 1996) (quoting State v. Davis. 821 P.2d 9, 11 [Utah App. 
1991]); see also State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994). In finding clear error the 
Court "must decide that the factual findings made by the trial court are not adequately 
supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
trial court's determination." Pena. 869 P.2d at 935-36. "The trial court's legal conclusions 
are reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge's 
application of the legal standard to the facts." Wells. 928 P.2d at 388 (quoting State v. 
Moreno. 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 [Utah App.]); see also Pena. 869 P.2d at 935-40. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41 -6-44.6 
(2) [A] person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
within this state if the person has any measurable controlled substance or 
metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body. 
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(5) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of this 
section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has 
occurred, although not in the officer's presence, and if the officer has probable 
cause to believe that the violation was committed by the person. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
An Information filed in the Iron County Justice Court on March 8,2001, charged Troy 
Stephen Hechtle, Appellant, with Driving With Any Measurable Controlled Substance in the 
Body, a Class B Misdemeanor; Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, to 
wit: Marijuana, a Class B Misdemeanor; Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B 
Misdemeanor; and Speeding, a Class C Misdemeanor (R. 40-41). 
II. Course of Proceedings 
The Iron County Attorney transferred the Appellant's case from the Iron County 
Justice Court to the Fifth Judicial District Court on November 20,2000. There was no final 
adjudication in the Iron County Justice Court (R. 126-127). 
III. Disposition in the Trial Court 
A suppression hearing was held on April 2, 2002, following the submission of 
memoranda submitted by both parties addressing whether Trooper Bairett was justified in 
frisking the Appellant following a traffic stop where the trooper believed to have reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity. The issue of probable cause was not addressed in either 
party's memorandum; however, the Appellee addressed the issue of probable cause in closing 
arguments at the suppression hearing (R. 216 at 81). During closing arguments, the Appellee 
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submitted to the court that it could find probable cause to make the arrest and if the court 
found this to be the case, then the frisk would be incident to arrest. Id. The motion to 
suppress was denied and the district court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order by the Honorable Judge J. Philip Eves, District Court Judge, on April 18, 2002. 
The Honorable Judge Eves found that there was probable cause to arrest the Appellant and, 
therefore, did not reach the issue of the Terry frisk because the search was incident to arrest 
(R. 172-181). 
On June 17,2002, a Judgment was filed wherein the Appellant pled guilty to Speeding 
and entered conditional pleas of guilty to Driving with Any Measurable Controlled Substance 
in the Body, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia. The Appellant was sentenced, and the sentence was stayed pending an appeal 
(R. 187-191). 
On July 12, 2002, a Notice of Appeal was filed by the Appellant (R. 196-197). 
On July 31, 2002, an Amended Judgment was filed and signed by the Honorable 
Judge J. Philip Eves, District Court Judge (R. 206-209). 
IV. Statement of the Facts 
1. On February 11, 2001, at approximately 3:20 p.m. (R. 216 at 28), Trooper 
Brian Bairett, Utah Highway Patrol, was on duty and acting in his official capacity (R. 216 
at 6). Trooper Bairett was driving southbound on Interstate 15 approximately 5-10 miles 
south of Cedar City, Utah. At that time, Trooper Bairett observed the Appellant's blue 
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Oldsmobile Alero traveling northbound on Interstate 15 at a rate of 97 miles per hour (mph), 
as indicated on his radar unit (R. 216 at 6-7). The speed limit on this section of freeway is 
75 mph (R. 216 at 17). 
2. The Trooper proceeded to pursue the Alero on northbound 1-15 and paced 
the Alero at 88 mph (R. 216 at 7). The Trooper then initiated a traffic stop of the Alero at 
mile marker 54 on 1-15, Iron County, State of Utah (R. 216 at 7-8, 55). 
3. As Trooper Bairett walked to the driver's side of the Alero, he noticed that 
the driver and the front passenger were lighting up cigarettes (R. 216 at 8). He also noted 
an older female passenger in the rear seat of the Alero (R. 216 at 18). Speaking with the 
driver through the driver's front window, the Trooper asked the Appellant for his driver's 
license, registration, and insurance card, and if the Appellant would put out the cigarette he 
had just lit (R. 216 at 30). The Appellant produced all the requested documents and put out 
the lit cigarette. Id. While the Trooper was standing at the driver's window, he noticed two 
or three air fresheners in the vehicle (R. 216 at 8, 10-11). 
4. Trooper Bairett returned to his vehicle to write the Appellant a ticket for 
speeding (R. 216 at 12). During the process, he ran the Appellant's information through 
dispatch and the Appellant was found to have a valid license; however, there was a corrective 
lense restriction on the license. Id. After the Trooper finished writing the ticket, he returned 
to the driver's side of the vehicle (R. 216 at 13). 
5. The Trooper asked the Appellant about the corrective lense restriction and 
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inquired whether the Appellant was wearing corrective lenses. Id. The Appellant, wearing 
a pair of dark sunglasses, responded he had undergone laser surgery to correct his vision and 
he no longer needed to wear corrective lenses. Id- As he was talking, the Appellant removed 
his sunglasses which allowed Trooper Bairett to view his eyes. Id. 
6. Trooper Bairett observed that the Appellant's eyes were red, watery, droopy, 
and dilated beyond what he believed to be normal. Id. The Trooper asked about the 
condition of the Appellant's eyes. The Appellant responded that his eyes were in this 
condition because of a lack of sleep (R. 216 at 46). At this point, the Trooper believed that 
the Appellant may be under the influence of a drug (R. 216 at 13). While the Appellant was 
still seated in the vehicle, the Trooper asked the Appellant if he could see his tongue. Id. 
The Appellant freely opened his mouth and extended his tongue. Trooper Bairett observed 
that the Appellant's tongue was coated with a green substance and that there were blisters 
located on the back of the tongue. Id. 
7. Trooper Bairett had been working with the Utah Highway Patrol for over four 
years at the time of this stop (R. 216 at 6, 24). He had been extensively trained in drug 
detection and interdiction (R. 216 at 8-10). Trooper Bairett's training in this particular area 
included: training at the academy (R. 216 at 8); training in-service under three different 
certified Drug Recognition Experts (R. 216 at 8, 41); attendance at the week-long Desert 
Snow Drug Recognition and Interdiction Training Course (R. at 216 at 8-9); attendance at 
the HIDTA School for drug law enforcement (R. 216 at 9); hundreds of hours of training in 
drug interdiction (R. 216 at 9), and participation in hundreds of drug-related investigations 
and arrests (R. 216 at 9-10). From Trooper Bairett's own experience, about ninety percent 
(90%) of his drug cases involved marijuana (R. 216 at 10). 
8. During the course of his drug detection and interdiction training, Trooper 
Bairett had been taught to look for clues of drug use while speaking to motorists on the 
highway. Some of those clues are: (1) the use of various means to attempt to mask the odor 
of drugs in the car, such as smoking cigarettes during a confrontation with law enforcement 
and using multiple air fresheners (R. 216 at 40); (2) the reddening, watering, droopiness and 
extreme dilation of pupils that follows recent use of marijuana (R. 216 at 47); (3) the 
presence of a green coating on the tongue of persons who have been smoking marijuana (R. 
216 at 47-48, 54); and (4) the presence of blisters on the rear of the tongue caused by the hot 
smoke inhaled by marijuana users (R. 216 at 49, 54-55). 
9. When Trooper Bairett observed the Appellant's red, droopy, watery eyes and 
his green tongue with blisters, in connection with the lighting of the cigarettes immediately 
after the stop by the front seat passengers of the Alero (as though to mask any odors in the 
vehicle), and the presence of several air fresheners in the car (as though to mask odors), 
Trooper Bairett concluded that the Appellant had been smoking marijuana and was then 
probably under the influence of the drug (R. 216 at 13-14). He then asked the Appellant to 
step out of the vehicle (R. 216 at 14). The Trooper intended at that moment to arrest the 
Appellant for driving with the metabolite of marijuana in his system (R. 216 at 59). The 
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Trooper also intended to ask the Appellant to voluntarily participate in several field sobriety 
tests to help the officer determine how recent the marijuana use had been. Id. 
10. Upon the Appellant's exiting the vehicle, the Trooper asked the Appellant if 
he had any weapons, and the Appellant said that he did not (R. 216 at 36). The Appellant 
was wearing a large leather jacket which could have concealed weapons (R. 216 at 15). 
Trooper Bairett then proceeded to perform a pat-down search of the Appellant's outer 
clothing to determine if he had any weapons (R. 216 at 14). Since the Trooper intended to 
arrest the Appellant (R. 216 at 59), and the Trooper intended to administer the tests which 
would place the Trooper in close proximity to the Appellant while his attention was focused 
on demonstrating and evaluating the tests, Trooper Bairett felt that he should determine 
whether the Appellant was armed before proceeding further (R. 216 at 14). At least one of 
the tests contemplated by the Trooper involved the Trooper standing with his head tilted back 
and eyes closed during the demonstration phase of the test (R. 216 at 60). 
11. Trooper Bairett also felt vulnerable because he was alone about five miles 
from Cedar City, with three people to watch during the arrest and testing (R. 216 at 22-23). 
12. During the pat-down of the Appellant's outer clothing, the Trooper felt 
in the left side of the leather jacket a hard object which he immediately recognized (through 
his training and experience) as a short pipe of the type commonly used by marijuana smokers 
(R. 216 at 14). Trooper Bairett asked the Appellant to hand him the pipe and the Appellant 
then produced the brass pipe with what the Trooper believed to contain marijuana residue 
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(R. 216 at 14-15). 
13. Trooper Bairett then placed the Appellant under arrest and handcuffed him 
(R. 216 at 15). The Appellant was read the Miranda warnings and he waived his right to 
remain silent. Id. The Appellant admitted to having smoked marijuana earlier that same day 
and he directed Trooper Bairett to a can located under the driver's seat in the vehicle that 
contained several bags of what the Trooper believed to be marijuana (R. 216 at 16). 
14. During the search of the car and the other passengers, additional amounts of 
what Trooper Bairett believed to be marijuana buds and seeds and other drug paraphernalia 
were found and taken into custody (R. 216 at 16, 18). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Based on Trooper Bairett's training, experience and knowledge, and taking into 
consideration the totality of the circumstances as Trooper Bairett believed them to be, and 
resolving all inferences in a light most favorable to the arresting officer, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's decision that Trooper Bairett had probable cause to arrest the 
Appellant for Driving Under the Influence of a Controlled Metabolite and that the search 
which recovered additional evidence was incident to arrest. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DECIDED THERE WAS PROBABLE 
CAUSE TO ARREST THE APPELLANT FOR DRIVING WITH A 
MEASURABLE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN THE BODY, A 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.6 (2000). 
A. The arrest of the Appellant was lawful because it was supported by 
probable cause and was authorized by statute. 
Based on the information Trooper Bairett observed and gathered from the initial 
traffic stop, specifically: (1) Appellant traveling at a rate of 97 mph in an Oldsmobile Alero 
(R. 216 at 6); (2) both front seat passengers of the vehicle lighting cigarettes at the same time 
(attempting to mask odors in the vehicle) as the Trooper approached the vehicle (R. 216 at 
8); (3) multiple air fresheners in the vehicle (attempting to mask odors) (R. 216 at 8,10-11); 
(4) Appellant's eyes being red, droopy, watery, and pupils being dilated beyond what is 
considered to be normal (R. 216 at 13); and (5) Appellant's tongue coated with a green film 
and blisters located on the back of the tongue (Id.); Trooper Bairett, taking into consideration 
his training and experience as a law enforcement officer, believed the Appellant to be driving 
under the influence of a controlled metabolite, to wit: marijuana, and, given the totality of 
the circumstances, believed to have probable cause to justify arresting the Appellant for the 
said criminal activity. 
An arrest is lawful if it is supported by probable cause and authorized by statute. State 
v. Trane. 2002 UT 97, 57 P.3d 1052, 1059; see also State v. Harmon. 910 P.2d 1196, 1199-
1204 (Utah 1995). The Utah Code states: 
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(2) [A] person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle within this state if the person has any measurable controlled substance 
or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body. 
(5) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of 
this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has 
occurred, although not in the officer's presence, and if the officer has probable 
cause to believe that the violation was committed by the person. 
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 41-6-44.6 (2000). 
This section of the code allows for a peace officer to make an arrest for driving under 
the influence of any controlled substance or metabolite when the officer has probable cause. 
Given the totality of the circumstances, Trooper Bairett had probable cause to believe there 
had been a violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.6, and he had probable cause to 
believe the violation was committed by the Appellant. Trooper Bairett was justified in 
arresting the Appellant for Driving with a Measurable Controlled Metabolite, to wit: 
marijuana, in his body because he had probable cause to do so. 
B. A law enforcement officer's training, experience and knowledge may be 
used when determining whether there is probable cause to make an 
arrest. 
In State v. Wright. 1999 Ut App 86, 977 P.2d 505, 507 (1999), this Court, in 
discussing probable cause, stated: 
Probable cause is present when " ' "the facts and circumstances within [the 
officers'] knowledge and of which they ha[ve] reasonable trustworthy 
information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable 
caution in the belief that" an offense has been or is being committed.' " Id. 
(alterations in original) (quoting State v. Dorsev. 731 P.2d 1085,1088 (Utah 
1986) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949))). It 
is "an objective standard" — a peace officer's subjective beliefs are not the 
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benchmark. Id. Even so, a court may consider an officer's particular 
experience and education in determining whether probable cause exists. 
(emphasis added). 
"The line between mere suspicion and probable cause . . . necessarily must be drawn 
by an act of judgment formed in the light of the particular situation and with account taken 
of all the circumstances." Dorsey, 731 P.2d at 1088 (quoting Brinegar. 338 U.S. at 176). 
This court has also stated, "[i]n reviewing the existence of probable cause, we should always 
take into account the experience of the particular law enforcement officers. They are entitled 
to draw reasonable inferences from the surrounding facts in light of their knowledge of the 
area and their prior experience...." State v. Poole 871 P.2d 531, 535 (Utah 1994). "Police 
officers by virtue of their experience and training can sometimes recognize illegal activity 
where ordinary citizens would not. Some recognition should appropriately be given to that 
experience and training where there are objective facts to justify the ultimate conclusion." 
Dorsey, 731 P.2d at 1088. See also United States v. Ortiz. 422 U.S. 891, 897 (1975); United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce. 422 U.S. 873,881 (1975); Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1,23 (1968). 
Probable cause is determined from the objective standpoint of a "prudent, reasonable, 
cautious police officer... guided by his experience and training." Id. (quoting United States 
v. Davis. 458 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir.1972)). "The trained law enforcement officer is in a 
different position than the average citizen . . . he may be able to perceive and articulate 
meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer... [he] 
is entitled to assess the facts in light of his experience." State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537 (Utah 
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App. 1990). 
At the time when the Appellant's vehicle was stopped, Trooper Bairett was not a new 
recruit, but he was a Utah Highway Patrolman with four years of experience and had 
undergone extensive drug detection and interdiction training during this 4-year period (R. 
216 at 24). His drug detection and interdiction training and experience included: (1) training 
at the academy (R. 216 at 8); (2) training in-service under certified Drug Recognition Experts 
(R. 216 at 8, 41); (3) attendance at the week-long Desert Snow Drug Recognition and 
Interdiction Training Course (R. 216 at 8-9); (4) attendance at the HIDTA School for drug 
law enforcement (R. 216 at 9); (5) hundreds of hours of training in drug interdiction (Id.); 
(6) participation in hundreds of drug-related investigations and arrests of which 90% of them 
were marijuana-related (R. 216 at 9-10). Needless to say, Trooper Bairett was by no means 
ordinary when it came to knowledge of drugs and drug-related offenses. The State of Utah 
has an interest in having its officers trained in the area of drug detection and interdiction so 
they can understand and fulfill what is required of them in fighting the war on drugs and 
helping to maintain safe communities and highways. Therefore, law enforcement officers 
(including Trooper Bairett), by nature of their job, will receive training in how to detect drugs 
so they can effectively do their job. The troopers of the highway patrol have more experience 
in traffic stops than regular law enforcement officers because highway patrol troopers work 
with traffic every time they are on duty. They do not deal with other routine offenses that 
other law enforcement officers are faced with. 
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During the four years of Trooper Bairett's training and experience he was taught to 
look for and identify possible clues of drug use while communicating with motorists on the 
highway. Among the clues he has been taught to look for are: (1) the use of various means 
to attempt to mask the odor of drugs in the car, such as smoking cigarettes during a 
confrontation with law enforcement and using multiple air fresheners (R. 216 at 40); (2) the 
reddening, watering, and droopiness of the eyes (R. 216 at 13) and extreme dilation of the 
pupils that follows recent use of marijuana (R. 216 at 47); (3) the presence of a green coating 
or film on the tongue of persons who have been smoking marijuana (R. 216 at 47-48, 54); 
(4) the presence of blisters on the rear of the tongue caused by hot smoke which marijuana 
users inhale (R. 216 at 49, 54-55). 
The facts and circumstances within Trooper Bairett's knowledge during the encounter 
with the Appellant would lead any "prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer," Dorsey, 
731 P.2d at 1088, with the same amount of experience and training as Trooper Bairett, to 
believe that an offense has been or is being committed. Id. The objective standard that 
should be applied to this case is whether a reasonable, prudent person would have arrived at 
the same belief as Trooper Bairett, given the facts, training, and experience which Trooper 
Bairett had been given. 
Trooper Bairett observed the Appellant's Oldsmobile Alero traveling at a rate of 97 
mph in a 75 mph zone, as indicated by his radar unit (R. 216 at 6). Traveling at 97 mph in 
and of itself is an inherently dangerous activity which would lead a prudent, reasonable, 
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cautious law enforcement officer to investigate as to why a person is traveling at such a high 
rate of speed. It may lead an officer to believe the driver may be under the influence of 
alcohol or a drug because an ordinary person in his or her right frame of mind would not be 
traveling at such a dangerous speed for no reason. 
Once the vehicle had been pulled over for traveling 97 mph, Trooper Bairett 
approached the driver's side window. As he was approaching the vehicle, Trooper Bairett 
observed both the driver and front seat passenger in the vehicle light up cigarettes at the same 
time (R. 216 at 8). From Trooper Bairett's training and experience (listed above), he 
recognized this particular activity as being an indicator of possible drug use or possession in 
the vehicle because lighting of cigarettes is often used to try to mask the smell or odor of 
drugs in the vehicle (R. 216 at 40). This specific activity heightened Trooper Bairett's senses 
to be looking for other possible clues he had been taught to recognize as indicators of drug 
use or possession. Trooper Bairett testified that from his own police experience when he 
stops people on the road and the occupants light up cigarettes as he approaches the vehicle, 
only one percent of the occupants do not go to jail (R. 216 at 39). From Trooper Bairett's 
experience, lighting of cigarettes by the vehicle's occupants is a strong indicator of drug use 
or possession. 
While Trooper Bairett was conversing with the Appellant through the driver's side 
window, he observed multiple air fresheners in the vehicle (R. 216 at 8). Once again this 
caught the Trooper's attention because of his training and experience. The Trooper had been 
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taught that multiple air fresheners in a vehicle is an indicator of trying to mask the smell or 
odor of drugs in a vehicle (R. 216 at 40). 
Up to this point, Trooper Bairett had observed the Appellant's Oldsmobile Alero 
traveling at 97 mph, the Appellant and one passenger lighting cigarettes as he approached 
the vehicle, and multiple air fresheners located in the Appellant's vehicle. All of these were 
indicators to Trooper Bairett, because of his training and experience, of possible drug use or 
possession. As the Trooper observed each of these indicators, in turn his suspicions 
continued to raise that an offense had been committed or was being committed. 
With his suspicions heightened, Trooper Bairett returned to his patrol car to run a 
check on the Appellant's driver's license status. It was at this point the Trooper was 
informed that the Appellant's driver's license had a corrective lense restriction on it (R. 216 
at 12). This information justified the further questioning by the Trooper to the Appellant. 
Upon returning to the vehicle, Trooper Bairett questioned the Appellant regarding the 
corrective lense restriction. During this conversation, the Appellant, absent any request by 
the Trooper, freely removed his sunglasses (R. 216 at 13). This act by the Appellant allowed 
the Trooper to directly observe the eyes of the Appellant. Trooper Bairett observed the 
Appellant's eyes to be red, droopy, and watery and the Appellant's pupils to be dilated 
beyond what Trooper Bairett believed to be normal. Id. Because of Trooper Bairett's 
training and experience, he recognized the condition of the Appellant's eyes as being yet 
other indicators of drug use. 
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The Trooper initiated additional questioning to determine whether the Appellant 
showed other indicators of drug use. During Trooper Bairett's training he had been taught 
that a green film or coating on the tongue, along with blisters on the back of the tongue, are 
strong indicators of marijuana use (R. 216 at 47-48,54). Trooper Bairett asked the Appellant 
to stick out his tongue (R. 216 at 13). The Appellant, in response to the Trooper's request, 
freely opened his mouth and extended his tongue for the Trooper to observe. Id. Trooper 
Bairett observed the Appellant to have a green coating or film on his tongue along with 
blisters on the back of his tongue. Id. Because of Trooper Bairett's training and experience, 
he recognized the condition of the Appellant's tongue as being indicative of recent marijuana 
use. 
Taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances - (1) Appellant's 
Oldsmobile Alero traveling at 97 mph; (2) both front seat passengers of the vehicle lighting 
cigarettes at the same time (indicating an attempt to mask odors in the vehicle) as the trooper 
approached the vehicle; (3) multiple air fresheners in the vehicle (indicating an attempt to 
mask odors in the vehicle); (4) Appellant's eyes being red, droopy, watery, and pupils being 
dilated beyond what is considered to be normal; (5) Appellant's tongue coated with a green 
film and blisters located on the back of the tongue - and Trooper Bairett's training and 
experience, Trooper Bairett's progressive suspicion was raised to probable cause to arrest the 
Appellant for Driving Under the Influence of a Controlled Metabolite, to wit: marijuana. 
Trooper Bairett was performing his job and duty in a way that he had been taught. His 
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training and experience led him on a path that ended with a confession by the Appellant of 
having used marijuana earlier in the day and led to the discovery of a container of marijuana 
in the car. Law enforcement officers must be able to use their training to make reasonable 
inferences when they are led to believe criminal activity is occurring. 
Trooper Bairett was trained to know what to look for when trying to determine 
whether a person is under the influence of a drug. He observed six factors which led him to 
believe the Appellant was under the influence of a drug. Trooper Bairett used his training 
to reach his conclusion that the Appellant was under the influence of marijuana while driving 
his vehicle. The Appellant asserts that the Trooper's training and being certified as a 
Category I peace officer is not enough for the Trooper to detect drug use. Appellant asserts 
that Trooper Bairett needs to be certified as a Drug Recognition Expert in order to make the 
determination that the Appellant was under the influence of marijuana. (Appellant's Brief 
at 23-25). This line of reasoning by the Appellant leads to the conclusion that a law 
enforcement officer would need to have a separate special certificate for each individual 
crime in order for the officer to make a lawful arrest. There is no separate special certificate 
needed for an officer to detect or make an arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol, 
and the same is true for driving under the influence of a drug. The only certificate Trooper 
Bairett needed to make this specific arrest is one indicating that he is a fully certified 
Category I peace officer. Trooper Bairett is a fully certified Category I peace officer (R. 216 
at 6), and this certification gives him the authority to arrest a person for driving under the 
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influence of marijuana and to use his training in order to conclude a person may be driving 
with the drug in their system. 
C. Under the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, Trooper Bairett 
possessed adequate information to provide him with probable cause to 
justify arresting the Appellant for Driving Under the Influence of a 
Controlled Metabolite. 
As in State v. Poole. 871 P.2d 531 (Utah 1994) and State v. Menke. 787 P.2d 537 
(Utah App. 1990), this Court should apply a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. In Poole, 
this Court enumerated six factors (one of which was an unusual alteration in the truck bed) 
which led the Court to hold that the officers had probable cause to continue searching the 
vehicle after the defendants withdrew consent. The additional searching produced almost 
two-hundred (200) pounds of marijuana. The six enumerated factors the Court took into 
consideration collectively were not considered illegal activity when standing alone; however, 
when analyzed under the totality-of-the-circumstances, these factors produced probable cause 
for the continued search and it also pointed to the probability that criminal activity was 
occurring. 
In Menke, the officers articulated their suspicions and identified the specific facts 
which led to an inference of criminal activity, to wit: shoplifting. The three facts to which 
the officers pointed were: (1) the defendant was standing in front of a flower pot removing 
items from underneath his clothing; (2) the defendant was looking at the items like he had 
never seen them before; (3) the defendant was bagging the items in non-retail merchandise-
type bags. Menke, 787 P.2d at 541. These are not illegal activities and they are consistent 
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with innocent behavior, but these activities are also strongly indicative of shoplifting when 
considered under the totality of the circumstances. Based on the officers5 training and 
experience, the officers concluded that the activity of the defendant was suspicious and 
indicative of shoplifting. The court agreed with the officers' conclusion. Id. 
In the present case, Trooper Bairett articulated his suspicions and identified the facts 
on which they were based. The Trooper pointed to six facts which led to an inference of 
criminal activity, to wit: Driving Under the Influence of a Controlled Metabolite. Based on 
Trooper Bairett's training and experience, and taking into consideration the totality of the 
circumstances, he concluded that all of the indicators he observed were indicative of driving 
under the influence of marijuana and provided him with probable cause to arrest the 
Appellant. 
Even though there may be legitimate explanations or purposes to the listed factors or 
indicators, this alone does not defeat the existence of probable cause. Poole, 871 P.2d at 535. 
For example, in Poole, one of the listed factors was an unusual alteration in the truck bed that 
concealed a secret compartment. It is possible that this secret compartment would have 
legitimate purposes such as carrying camping or hunting equipment or protecting luggage 
from the weather. Id. In addressing this issue, the Court stated: 
The court, in finding probable cause . . . recognized that the individual details 
recited in the facts could also be consistent with innocent behavior since none 
of the acts observed were criminal. However, the court held that the 
circumstances, considered as a whole and in light of the experience of the 
narcotics agents, . . . [formed] a valid basis for a reasonably prudent police 
officer's belief that criminal conduct was afoot. Dorsey, 731 P.2d at 1089; see 
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Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,243-44 (noting relevant inquiry in determining 
probable cause is "not whether particular conduct is 'innocent' or'guilty,' but 
the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts"). 
Poole, 871 P.2d at 535. 
"[T]he mere possibility of innocent explanations 'would not suffice to diminish the 
reasonable likelihood of illegality appearing, from the circumstances, to prudent men 
possessing the knowledge and experience of the officers' . . . ." Id. (quoting Tobias v. 
United States, 375 A.2d 491, 494 (D.C. Ct. App.1977). Although there may be innocent 
explanations for particular conduct or conditions, it is not necessary that all legitimate 
reasons be absent before an officer finds probable cause. Poole, 871 P.2d at 535. 
In the present case, the Appellant asserts that the observation by Trooper Bairett of 
the Appellant's green tongue and blisters is the only indicator or factor that the Court should 
be concerned with because the Appellant gives reasons or explanations for the other factors 
that went into Trooper Bairett's determination of probable cause. The Appellant asserts that 
lighting up cigarettes and having multiple air fresheners in the vehicle are not illegal 
activities, but are innocuous activities that are normal for law-abiding citizens, and that the 
condition of Appellant's eyes being red, droopy, and watery and his pupils being dilated was 
caused by allergies and/or the fact that he had been up most of the night at a religious rival. 
Appellant's Brief at P.20. The Appellant gives no possible explanation regarding the green 
tongue or the blisters on the rear of the tongue, nor does he explain why he was driving at a 
dangerously high speed. 
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Even though the Appellant may have given legitimate explanations or purposes to 
some of Trooper Bairett's observed indicators, this alone does not defeat the existence of 
probable cause. Poole, 871 P.2d at 535. In applying Poole, Menke, and Dorsey to the present 
case, this Court should find that the totality of the circumstances, considered as a whole and 
in light of the experience and training of Trooper Bairett, formed a valid basis for a 
reasonably prudent highway patrolman's belief that criminal conduct was afoot, and there 
was probable cause to arrest for Driving Under the Influence of a Controlled Metabolite in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.6 (2000). See Poole. 871 P.2d at 535; Dorsey. 
731P.2datl089. 
D« The same probable cause standard is applied to the arrest warrant stage 
and the preliminary hearing stage. 
Probable cause at the arrest stage requires there be evidence known to the law 
enforcement officer which supports a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed, and 
the particular defendant has committed it. The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Recently, in State v. Clark. 2001 UT 9 at ppl5-16, 20 P.3d 300, we specified 
that at the preliminary hearing stage, the magistrate should apply the same 
probable cause standard as that applied at the arrest warrant stage. See Id. at 
P16, 20 P.3d at 303. Under this standard, "the prosecution must present 
sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been 
committed and that the defendant committed it." Id. (citing State v. Anderson, 
612 P.2d 778, 783-84 (Utah 1980). 
State v. Hawatmeh. 2001 UT 51, P15; 26 P.3d 223, 26; see also Trane, 57 P.3d at 1059 
(noting that "a suspect does not need to be guilty of the offense for which the officers 
arrested the suspect for the officers to have probable cause to arrest."); Henry v. United 
-22-
States, 361 U.S. 98,102 (1959) (indicating that "[e]vidence required to establish guilt is not 
necessary" for probable cause to arrest); Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175 (stating that "probable 
cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt And this means less than evidence which 
would justify condemnation or conviction."). Since the same probable cause standard applies 
to both the preliminary hearing stage and the arrest stage, then it follows that the arrest 
warrant stage would receive the same treatment as the preliminary hearing stage. The Utah 
Supreme Court has stated in regards to the preliminary hearing stage that "[i]n making a 
determination as to probable cause, the magistrate should view the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the prosecution and resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution." State v. 
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 (Utah 1995). The State asserts this same standard should apply 
to the arrest stage, specifically, the magistrate should view the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the arresting law enforcement officer and resolve all inferences in favor of the 
law enforcement officer making the arrest. 
Taking into consideration Trooper Bairett's complete training and experience, the 
totality of the circumstances as Trooper Bairett believed them to be, and resolving all 
inferences in favor of Trooper Bairett, this Court should find that the trooper had probable 
cause to arrest the Appellant for Driving Under the Influence of a Controlled Metabolite, to 
wit: marijuana, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41 -6-44.6 (2000). The six enumerated 
factors articulated by the Trooper led him to believe that the Appellant was probably under 
the influence of a drug, and this shows that Trooper Bairett's conclusion of probability or 
-23-
— n w i i imimiuiJiiiLi. mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmi i i.ii ii • — i ^ — — — i . i . j . . IJI..J111ILUI..1L.I mi 
probable cause was not based on mere suspicion or a hunch. The United States Supreme 
Court has stated, "[i]n dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we 
deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical 
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, 
act." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. at 178. "The line between 'mere suspicion and 
probable cause . . . necessarily must be drawn by an act of judgment formed in the light of 
the particular situation and with account taken of all the circumstances.'" Dorsey, 731 P.2d 
at 1088, (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176). Trooper Bairett, relying on his training and 
experience, concluded the Appellant was probably under the influence of marijuana while 
driving his vehicle and, according to the statute, was justified in making the arrest. Based 
on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling that Trooper Bairett had 
probable cause to arrest the Appellant for Driving Under the Influence of a Controlled 
Metabolite, to wit: marijuana, in accordance with UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.6 (2000). 
II. THE SEARCH OF THE APPELLANT, WHICH PRODUCED ADDITIONAL 
EVIDENCE, WAS INCIDENT TO ARREST AND THEREFORE 
CONSTITUTIONAL. 
Based on Trooper Bairett's training and experience, there was probable cause to arrest 
the Appellant for Driving Under the Influenced of a Controlled Metabolite when the 
Appellant was asked to exit the vehicle; therefore, the frisk which followed was incident to 
that arrest and did not violate the Appellant's Fourth Amendment rights. 
"Searches . . . conducted without a warrant are unreasonable per se unless they fall 
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within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment." State 
v. Spurgeon. 904 P.2d 220,226 (Utah App. 1995); see also State v. Bartlev, 784 P.2d 1231, 
1235 (Utah App.1989). "Departures from the warrant requirement must be limited to ' a few 
specifically established and will-delineated exceptions.'" Spurgeon, 904 P .2d at 226 (quoting 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 [1967]). Searches incident to arrest fall under the 
specific exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id. "Where the formal arrest followed 
quickly on the heels of the challenged search of [Appellant's] person, we do not believe it 
particularly important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa." Rawlings 
v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980). "A search of an automobile and its occupants 
pursuant to a lawful arrest are proper even for a misdemeanor arrest." State v. Moreno, 910 
P.2d 1245, 1249 (Utah App. 1996). 
In the present case, Trooper Bairett believed to have probable cause to arrest the 
Appellant for Driving Under the Influence of a Controlled Metabolite. The Trooper testified 
that it was his intent to arrest the Appellant for the crime when he asked him to step out of 
the vehicle (R. 216 at 59). The formal arrest of the Appellant immediately followed the 
initial search of the Appellant's outer clothing (R. 216 at 14-15). According to the United 
States Supreme Court, it is not of particular importance whether a search comes before or 
after the formal arrest as long as the search is contemporaneous to the arrest. Rawlings, 448 
U.S. at 111. Since the search of the Appellant was incident to arrest and contemporaneous 
to the arrest, the search of the Appellant was constitutional. Based on the foregoing, this 
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Court should affirm the trial court's decision that the search of the Appellant was incident 
to arrest and therefore constitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on Trooper Bairett's training, experience and knowledge, and taking into 
consideration the totality of the circumstances as Trooper Bairett believed them to be, and 
resolving all inferences in a light most favorable to the arresting officer, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's decision that Trooper Bairett had probable cause to arrest the 
Appellant for Driving Under the Influence of a Controlled Metabolite and that the search 
recovering additional evidence was incident to arrest. 
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